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Abstract 
Institutional investors have grown substantially in international, mature markets in 
last two decades parallel with the increase in their impact. They seek to own large 
proportions of equities; as a result they have become influential on performance of 
companies in which they invest. Previous studies show no conclusive evidence on 
the direction in the role of institutional investors on performance. 
This research attempts to examine the impact of institutional investors' 
involvement on performance of investee companies. This study relates corporate 
governance to performance by considering institutional investors' involvement as 
one of the governance dimensions. This thesis considers two variables for 
institutional investors' involvement, one is the whole number of institutional 
investors holding a particular stock, and the other is the institutional investors' 
representation on boards of investee companies. Performance was measured by 
using Tobin's q. The study was conducted using regression for three consecutive 
years, 2005, 2006, & 2007. The results show a statistically significant positive 
relation between the whole number of institutional investors and corporate 
performance in 2005 & 2006, but none in 2007. The results also show a 
statistically significant negative relation between institutional investors 
represented on board and firm's performance in 2005 & 2006, but none in 2007. 
These results call for further examination of the ownership by institutional 
investors and their relations with performance of investee companies.  
 
Key words: institutional investors, investee company, active monitoring, 
corporate governance, performance.   
  
iv
 tcartsbA cibarA
 اﻟﻤﻠﺨﺺ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ
أﺻѧﺒﺤﻮا ﻳﻤﻠﻜѧﻮن ﻧѧﺴﺐ آﺒﻴѧﺮﻩ ﻣѧﻦ , وﺑѧﺬﻟﻚ زاد ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮهѧﺎ , زاد ﺣﺠﻢ اﻻﺳﺘﺜﻤﺎر اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﻲ ﻓѧﻲ اﻟﻌﻘѧﺪﻳﻦ اﻷﺧﻴѧﺮﻳﻦ 
اﻟﺪراﺳﺎت اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻘﻪ ﻟﻢ ﺗﺨѧﺮج . ﺑﺬﻟﻚ أﺻﺒﺤﻮا ﻳﺆﺛﺮون ﻋﻠﻰ اداء اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮون ﺑﻬﺎ , ﻣﻠﻜﻴﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت 
  .اﻷداء اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻲ ﻟﻠﺸﺮآﺎت ﻋﻠﻰ ﺑﺄدﻟﺔ وﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ دﻗﻴﻘﺔ ﺣﻮل أهﻤﻴﺔ ودوراﻻﺳﺘﺜﻤﺎر اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﻲ
وﺗѧﺮﺑﻂ ﺑѧﻴﻦ , ﺗﻬﺪف هﺬﻩ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻟﻔﺤﺺ اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻻﺳﺘﺜﻤﺎر اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﻲ وأداء اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ ﻳѧﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮون ﺑﻬѧﺎ 
وﺗﺄﺧѧﺬ هѧﺬﻩ .  اﻟﺤﻮآﻤѧﻪ أﺑﻌѧﺎدﺣﻮآﻤѧﺔ اﻟѧﺸﺮآﺎت واﻷداء اﻟﻤѧﺎﻟﻲ ﻋﻠѧﻰ اﻋﺘﺒѧﺎر أن اﻻﺳѧﺘﺜﻤﺎر اﻟﻤﺆﺳѧﺴﻲ هѧﻮ أﺣѧﺪ 
اﻷول هѧﻮ اﻟﻌѧﺪد اﻟﻜﻠѧﻲ ﻟﻠﻤѧﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮﻳﻦ اﻟﻤﺆﺳѧﺴﻴﻴﻦ واﻻﺧѧﺮ , ﺆﺳѧﺴﻲ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻣﺘﻐﻴﺮﻳﻦ ﻟﻘﻴﺎس ﺣﺠﻢ اﻻﺳѧﺘﺜﻤﺎر اﻟﻤ 
وﺗѧﻢ ﻗﻴѧﺎس اﻷداء اﻟﻤѧﺎﻟﻲ . هﻮ ﻋѧﺪد اﻟﻤѧﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮﻳﻦ اﻟﻤﺆﺳѧﺴﻴﻴﻦ ﻓѧﻲ ﻣﺠѧﺎﻟﺲ إدارة اﻟѧﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﺘѧﻲ ﻳѧﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮون ﺑﻬѧﺎ 
   ( .Q s'niboT) ﻟﻠﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮ ﺑﻬﺎ ﺑﻤﻘﻴﺎس 
اﻟﻨﺘѧﺎﺋﺞ ﺑﻴﻨѧﺖ  . 7002 & 6002, 5002  ,وﺗﻢ ﺗﻨﻔﻴﺬ اﻟﺪراﺳﻪ ﺑﺈﺳﺘﺨﺪام ﺗﺤﻠﻴﻞ اﻹﻧﺤﺪار ﻟѧﺜﻼث ﺳѧﻨﻮات ﻣﺘﺘﺎﻟﻴѧﺔ 
 5002وﺟﻮد ﻋﻼﻗﺔ ﻃﺮدﻳﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﻌﺪد اﻟﻜﻠѧﻲ ﻟﻠﻤѧﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮﻳﻦ اﻟﻤﺆﺳѧﺴﻴﻴﻦ وأداء اﻟѧﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﻤѧﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮ ﺑﻬѧﺎ ﻟﻠѧﺴﻨﻮات 
وآѧﺬﻟﻚ وﺟѧﻮد ﻋﻼﻗѧﺔ ﻋﻜѧﺴﻴﺔ ﺑѧﻴﻦ ﻋѧﺪد اﻟﻤѧﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮﻳﻦ اﻟﻤﺆﺳѧﺴﻴﻴﻦ ﻓѧﻲ  , 7002 وﻟѧﻢ ﻳﺜﺒѧﺖ ﻓѧﻲ ﺳѧﻨﺔ  6002& 
   . ﻓﻘﻂ6002ﺳﻨﺔﻣﺠﺎﻟﺲ اﻹدارة ﻟﻠﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮ ﺑﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ 
ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ هﺬﻩ اﻟﺪراﺳﻪ ﻋﻠѧﻰ اﻟѧﺮﻏﻢ ﻣѧﻦ ﻋѧﺪم اﺛﺒﺎﺗﻬѧﺎ اﻟﻘѧﺎﻃﻊ ﺗﻨѧﺎدي ﺑﺈهﺘﻤѧﺎم أآﺒѧﺮﻹاﻣﺘﻼك اﻟﻤѧﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮﻳﻦ اﻟﻤﺆﺳѧﺴﻴﻴﻦ 
 .وﻋﻼﻗﺘﻬﻢ ﺑﺈدارة اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ  ﻳﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮون ﺑﻬﺎ وﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮهﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺤﻮآﻤﺔ وﻷاداء اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻲ 
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1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
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1.1 Overview  
One of the clear differences between regional and global stock markets is the 
trade volume of the institutional investors which constitute more than 85% of the 
total trading volume in developed stock markets, while individual investors are 
the majority in the Arab region. As a result, it will be difficult for the region's 
stock markets to substantially evolve and earn the depth and maturity they require 
in the absence of local or global institutional investments. (Azzam, 2007)  
The expanding role of institutional investors in emerging markets can help 
promote these developments. They may also have a positive impact on the more 
efficient mobilization of domestic savings and thus encourage the supply of 
productive capital (Blommestein and Funke, 1998). 
The change in equity ownership mirrored the shift in household portfolio 
composition away from direct ownership of financial claims and toward 
ownership through financial intermediaries. Lower transaction costs of mutual 
funds, tax-favored promotion of pensions and saving, and the increased 
willingness of state and local government retirement funds to hold equities 
contributed to the new importance of institutional investors. 
While equity holdings by institutional investors have grown substantially since 
1980, they have not grown uniformly. In particular, holdings by banks and 
insurance companies have declined in relative importance to holdings by mutual 
funds and pension funds. Since 1990, the period of the most explosive growth of 
institutional-investor holdings, the greatest relative growth has been of holdings 
by mutual funds and private pension funds (Hubbard, 1999). The rise and 
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volatility of international capital flows has often been regarded as a major source 
of financial crises in emerging markets during the 1990s. An important 
component of these flows has been portfolio investment in the form of investment 
in equities and bonds. In most cases, investors behind these portfolio flows to 
emerging markets are institutional investors, such as mutual or pension funds and 
insurance companies. As a matter of fact, institutional investors can be regarded 
as the kingpins of financial globalization. At least for mature markets (Frenkel & 
Menkhoff, 2003). 
This study focuses on the impact of institutional investors on corporate 
management in relation to performance, and active monitoring. 
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1.2 Problem Statement 
This thesis investigates the impact of institutional investors on performance of 
Palestinian companies listed at the PSE. 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
Due to the size and professional advantage of institutional investors, they usually 
play an important role in companies in which they invest. 
This study investigates the impact and of institutional investors on corporate 
performance, this will include the impact of 
• The size of institutional investors in Palestine Securities Exchange  
• The difference between the impact of the whole number of institutional 
investors and the number of institutional investors represented on the 
board of the investee companies on investee company' performance. 
1.4 Research questions 
Through investigating the impact of institutional investors on corporate 
performance, this study should answer the following questions, 
1. Does the involvement by institutional investors have an impact on 
corporate financial performance? 
2. Is there a difference between the involvement of whole number of 
institutional investors and board member institutional investors? 
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Definitions  
Institutional investor: An entity with large amounts to invest, such as investment 
companies, mutual funds, brokerages, insurance companies, pension funds, 
investment banks and endowment funds. Institutional investors are covered by 
fewer protective regulations because it is assumed that they are more 
knowledgeable and better able to protect themselves. (www.investword.com). 
This research considers all corporate investment (local & foreign) as institutional 
investment due to the insufficient of data at the Palestine Securities Exchange 
(PSE). 
Performance: is the financial performance of investee companies listed at the 
PSE and was measured by Tobin's q (market value of firm / corporate net 
worth).  
 
1.5 Need & Importance of the Study 
Institutional investors have become increasingly willing to use their ownership 
rights to pressure managers to act in the best interest of the shareholders (Cornett, 
M et al, 2005). As these investors have increased their ownership share in firms, 
there has been an increased focus by researchers on their role in monitoring, 
disciplining and influencing financial performance. 
The importance of this study stems from the fact that corporations in Palestine 
operates in an emerging, less efficient market, so that this study will show the 
importance of institutional investors in emerging markets, to what degree they are 
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participating in corporate ownership in Palestine, and to what extent they are 
enhancing corporate  financial performance and governance. 
 
1.6 The Research Organization 
This study will be divided into two parts, including chapters; the first part is the 
literature review of what have been written about the subject. 
The second part is an analytical view for the impact if institutional investors on 
Palestinian corporations in particular. 
• Chapter one: Introduction 
• Chapter two: Literature review 
• Chapter three: Research design & Methodology 
• Chapter four: Data analysis & results 
• Chapter five: Conclusion & recommendations  
Data source: data used by the study was gathered through secondary source 
(previous studies, books & articles), and a primary source: through observations 
& some research instruments like empirical testing for data sets using regression 
analysis. 
Research approach: the primary data was collected through descriptive data 
using empirical testing for 18 randomly selected companies listed on the Palestine 
Securities Exchange (PSE), data acquired from corporate annual reports & the 
PSE year book to assess the impact on financial performance. 
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1.7 Study limitations 
During conducting the research, many limitations were encountered. First of all, 
the lack of data about corporate governance in Palestine and the lack of data and 
literature about institutional investors & ownership structure in Palestine. The use 
of other measure of financial performance, other than Tobin's q may show 
different results. And one of the limitations was considering all corporate 
investment as institutional investment due to the absence of data about the size of 
ownership & classification of financial institutions in Palestine. Another important 
limitation is that the lack of sufficient years that limits the use of time series 
analysis before & after the involvement of institutional investors.     
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2 CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
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2.1 Introduction 
Institutional investors can be defined as economic entities with large amount of 
capital to invest; they include mutual funds, brokerages, insurance companies, 
pension funds, investment banks and endowment funds. Their potential influence 
as large shareholders was traced back to 1930 in the separation of owners from 
control of business to be in the hand of directors when was first introduced by 
Berle & Means, (1932). This separation of ownership was behind the agency 
problem, when managers (agents) might look for their own interest rather than on 
behalf the interest of shareholders. Over time the impact of institutional investors 
have been increasing, their shareholding in equities have grown dramatically since 
the middle of the 20th century, we can't underestimate their influential role on the 
macro & micro levels in the economy especially when we talk about foreign 
institutional investment in the form of portfolio investment in the equities of 
emerging financial markets. On the macro level as outlined in Davis and Steil 
(2001), the growth of institutional investors can be traced to various supply and 
demand factors that have made investing via institutions attractive to households. 
Supply-side factors suggest that institutions have offered their services relatively 
more efficiently than banks and direct holdings, thus fulfilling the functions of the 
financial system more effectively, while demand-side factors imply households 
have enhanced requirements for the types of financial functions that institutional 
investors are able to fulfill. On the supply side, there is an ease of diversification, 
liquidity, improved corporate control, deregulation, ability to take advantage of 
technological developments, and enhanced competition, as well as fiscal 
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inducements and the difficulties of social security pensions. On the demand side, 
one may highlight demographic aspects (notably funding of pensions and 
population ageing) and growing wealth. 
On the other side, on the micro level which is our concern in this study, it seems 
to be that institutional investors have a positive influence on corporate finance that 
includes value maximization (stock price maximization), corporate financial 
performance and corporate governance. They enhance transparency, 
accountability and better information disclosure, they also contribute to more 
stock liquidity, and they also have more interest than other parties or minorities in 
monitoring management. Those practices by institutional investors are referred to 
"shareholders' activism". 
But some literature has pointed the inverse effect of involving institutional 
investors in the firm's ownership, such as high volatility in stock prices, and the 
possible conflict of interest between large shareholders and small investors.  
Equity holding by institutional investors have grown substantially since 1980, 
then they held about 36% of total equities in the in the developed markers. This 
percentage has grown to more than 70% after the year 2000. In 1995 the total 
assets of such institutions in the main regions in the OECD (Organization of 
Economic Cooperation & Development) area amounted to more than 
$24.4 trillion (an astonishing 106.7% of GDP). And between 1990 and 1995 the 
average annual growth of holdings by institutional investors reached 10.5%. 
This increasing importance of the new market engines (institutional investors) 
makes it valuable to investigate their role on corporate performance in the 
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Palestinian listed companies. In this part of the study, we will review the literature 
in a descriptive and analytical approach and the impact of institutional investors 
on corporate governance, and that will focus on corporate financial performance 
measured by Tobin's Q (market value/book value)  as one of the corporate 
governance dimensions.  
This chapter will be divided into two main parts; the first discusses empirical 
evidences by research studies and what has been written in the institutional 
investors and performance, the other focuses on the Palestinian context, in other 
words, what already exists in topic about the Palestinian market. 
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2.2 Main types of institutional investors  
2.2.1 Pension funds 
 The purpose of a pension fund is to pay retirement benefits in the future (Fabozzi 
& Modigliani, 1992). Private state and local entities acting on behalf of their 
employees, unions acting for their members and individuals acting on their own 
behalf are so-called plan sponsors when they establish pension plans. These plans 
are financed through either employer’s or both employer’s and employee’s 
contributions. The plans can be divided into two groups: defined contribution 
plans and defined benefit plans. In the first the plan sponsor makes specified 
contributions, usually as a percentage of the salary of employees, on behalf of 
qualified members. The actual retirement payment is known, but depends on the 
performance of the assets of the fund. In the second, however, the retirement 
payment is known, and depends on how long the employee has served the entity 
and the level of earnings. The assets of a corporate plan sponsor can be managed: 
in-house (i.e. by the company itself), by one or more money management entities 
on behalf of the company, or by a combination of these alternatives.  
2.2.2 Insurance companies 
 Insurance companies can be divided into life insurance companies and property 
and casualty insurance companies (Van, Boender & Guus, 1995). In case of death, 
a life insurance company makes a payment for the beneficiary as agreed when 
making the insurance agreement. However, life insurance companies offer several 
other products as well. Insurance for death can be combined with an investment 
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policy, where the payment depends on interest rates in the market. Alternatively 
the payment may depend on the market value of the investment at the time of 
death. Typically, pension funds apply an investment policy which guarantees a 
certain payment on a certain day in the future. The contracts of life insurance 
companies are in most cases characterized by this long maturity which means that 
these companies have to match their liabilities and investment income at any 
given point of time.  
2.2.3 Investment companies 
Investment companies are pools of funds of individual investors, they offer the 
possibility to diversify risk and lower the costs of contracting and processing 
information (Dobson, 1994). An individual investor can buy shares in an 
investment company, which are in proportion to the company’s diversified 
portfolio of investments. Investment companies can be categorized into three 
groups: open-ended funds, closed-ended funds and unit trusts. Open-ended funds, 
commonly called mutual funds, sell shares to individual investors and are willing 
to redeem their outstanding shares on demand. 
The price equals an appropriate share of the market value of the funds’ portfolio. 
An open-ended fund, called a mutual fund in the US and a unit trust in the UK, 
means that the outstanding shares will be redeemed on request, and that the 
number of shares is not fixed, but fluctuates as new shares are sold and 
outstanding are redeemed  Closed-ended funds sell shares but in most cases don’t 
redeem the shares. The price of a share depends on the supply and demand in the 
market place, and can be lower or higher than the net asset value. As is the case of 
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closed-ended fund, the number of shares of a unit trust is fixed. This type of fund 
invests mainly in bonds, but in a different way from mutual funds and closed-
ended funds. Trading in bonds is passive, the termination date of unit trusts is 
fixed and the portfolio of trust remains.  
But there are other considerations when categorizing institutional investors. 
several recent studies suggest that not all institutional investors are equal 
[Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988); Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005); Chen, 
Harford, and Li (2005)]. These papers hypothesize that some institutional 
investors (e.g., insurance companies or banks through their trust departments) 
have either existing or potential business relations with firms, and, in order to 
protect those relations, might be less willing to challenge management decisions. 
These investors are therefore labeled pressure-sensitive. In contrast, institutions 
such as investment companies and independent investment advisors may be less 
subject to pressure from the firms in which they invest and therefore better suited 
to monitor, discipline, and impose controls on corporate managers. These 
institutional investors are labeled pressure-insensitive. Using this classification, 
Almazan et al. (2005) show that greater share ownership by pressure-insensitive 
investors is associated with greater discipline on executive compensation. Using 
the same classification, Chen et al. (2005) find that pressure-insensitive ownership 
is associated with better acquisition decisions. 
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2.3 Factors behind the rise of institutional investors 
According to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) publications (1998), several common factors have been crucial in driving 
the growth of institutional investors as a group. Four are particularly important. 
First, the aging of populations has produced a rising demand for retirement 
‘products’ such as mutual-fund products, equity-indexed annuities, asset-backed 
securities and guaranteed-equity plans by increasingly well-off and sophisticated 
individual investors. Simultaneously, the baby-boom cohort of the 1940s and ’50s 
is causing looming fiscal problems in countries relying predominantly on pension 
systems financed by ‘pay-as-you-go’ contributions made through the state. This 
has stimulated the introduction of advance-funded pension schemes. 
Second, technological progress in communications and information processing 
has enhanced the capacity of the financial-services industry to provide 
intermediation and risk-management services by handling vast flows of 
information at very high speed and at very low costs. This trend is giving rise to a 
new breed of sophisticated investment products (money-market mutual funds, 
swaps, options and credit derivatives, for example) – a process supported by 
methodological break-through in the pricing of sophisticated financial 
instruments. The innovation and creativity characteristic of the US capital market 
has had a powerful impact on financial services in the world as a whole.  The 
third influence has been the deregulation of the banking and securities industries 
since the beginning of the 1980s, which has heightened competition between and 
among banks and other financial institutions. At the same time, the elimination of 
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restrictions on cross-border capital flows and on the entry of foreign financial 
institutions has further increased competition. These forces, together with the 
introduction of international capital standards for banks, have almost everywhere 
caused a massive move by banks into the fee and commission business associated 
with capital-market transactions, thereby further blurring separation lines between 
banks, insurance and fund-management. Fourth, disintermediation from banks, 
through reduced demand for bank deposits and traditional saving vehicles, has 
resulted in a shift in favor of more performance-oriented instruments like money-
market funds and mutual funds investing in equity. This process is particularly 
noticeable in the North American capital market, where the percentage share of 
bank deposits in total financial assets of the personal sector has fallen from 26% 
in 1976 to around 15% in 1996. But there is evidence of this trend also in other 
countries; for example, in France, cash and deposits as a percentage of total 
household assets fell from around 65% in 1976 to around 34% in 1996; and in 
Germany from 62% to 43%. Apart from these broad trends, a number of other 
factors are important, such as special tax-treatment of retirement savings, the rate 
of return on institutional savings products offered (relative to those obtainable 
from other financial products), the regulatory and supervisory infrastructure (and 
changes in it), as well as existing attitudes to the various means of savings – for 
example, the differences in countries with an ‘equity culture’ (mainly English-
speaking countries) versus those with a ‘banking culture’ (mainly continental 
Europe and Japan). In addition, many countries have policies that explicitly 
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promote particular types of institutional investors, private pension schemes chief 
among them.  
  
Table 1: US Equities Distribution (%) 
Year Households Mutual Funds Insurance & Pensions 
1950 89 2.3 4 
1970 75 5 12 
1980 59 3 23 
1992 54 7 28 
1997 43 10 30 
Source: Hubbard. G, et al, (1999). Institutional investors and corporate behaviorr. 
 
2.4 Institutional investors and corporate performance 
Institutional investors as corporate monitors were a focus of many studies and 
researches. Many studies in that field hypothesized that there is a link between 
institutional investors & corporate governance in one side and corporate 
governance & long-term corporate performance, but the findings appear to be 
fairly mixed. 
One of the earlier and much-quoted studies is that of Nesbitt (1994). Nesbitt 
reported positive long-term stock price returns for targeted firms. Subsequently, 
Millstein and MacAvoy (1998) found that corporations with active and 
independent boards appear to have performed much better in the 1990s than those 
with passive, non-independent boards in a study covered large US listed 
companies. Conversely, the work of Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, and Johnson (1998) 
concluded that no such relation between board composition and firms' 
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performance, and that there was no relationship between leadership structure 
(CEO/Chairman) and firm performance.  
Despite that evidence seems to appear quite mixed, there is a common perception 
that corporate governance can make a difference to the bottom line. A study by 
McKinsey (2002) found that investors are most likely willing to pay a premium to 
invest in a company with good corporate governance. The findings indicate that 
investors would pay 11% more for the shares of a well-governed Canadian 
company, 12% more for the shares of a well-governed UK company, and 14% 
more for the shares of a well-governed US company, compared to shares of a 
company with similar financial performance but poorer governance practices. So 
it's a matter of investor's perception that good governance leads to improved long-
term performance. 
Gompers, Ishii & Metrick. (2003) investigated the ways in which shareholder 
rights vary across firms. They found that firms with stronger shareholder rights 
had higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lower capital 
expenditures, and made fewer corporate acquisitions. Deutsche Bank (2004) 
studied the impact of corporate governance on portfolio management and 
concluded that corporate governance standards are an important for equity risk.  
Mallin & Runall (2006) pointed that shareholder activism is an important issue for 
deriving good corporate governance and without this there is less accountability 
and transparency, and hence management get more opportunities to work for their 
interest rather than owners' interest (value maximization). 
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 Large shareholders such as institutional investors can achieve sufficient benefits 
because they have an incentive to monitor due to the high cost of monitoring. 
Indeed, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) note that large shareholders may have a 
greater incentive to monitor managers than members of the board of directors, 
who may have little or no wealth invested in the firm. Other studies have found 
consistent results. 
The other side, Maug (1998) found that the size of shareholding is partially a 
function of institutions' ability to influence corporate decision. If institutional 
investor shareholdings are high, shares are less marketable and are thus held for 
longer periods. This is the case where there is greater incentive to monitor a firm’s 
management. However, when institutional investors hold relatively few shares in 
a firm, they can easily liquidate their investments if the firm performs poorly, and 
therefore have less incentive to monitor.  
However, it seems clear that large stockholders and institutional investors have 
become increasingly important to actively influence corporate governance, 
especially in poor performing firms. Gillan and Starks (2000) find that corporate 
governance proposals sponsored by institutional investors receive more 
importance in voting than those presented by individual investors. 
Hartzell and Starks (2003) show that there is an inverse relationship between the 
level of executive compensation and the level of shareholding and a positive 
relationship with pay-for-performance sensitivity & the level of shareholding. 
Chung et al. (2002) find that large institutional shareholdings in a firm prohibit 
managers from declaring pre-determined earnings through managing discretionary 
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accrual choices. Finally, Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003) show that institutional 
selling is associated with forced CEO turnover and that these CEOs are more 
likely to be replaced with an outsider, through effective voting against the 
dissatisfying CEO. 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) find that the amount of institutional investor 
ownership is positively related to a firm’s financial performance (Tobins' q 
measure). 
 On the opposite, other papers for Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), find no such 
significant relation. Thus, the relationship between institutional investor stock 
ownership and firm's performance is still unclear. 
This research adds to the literature on institutional investor ownership and firm 
performance by examining this relation for some Palestinian listed companies that 
are involved with institutional investors. This line of research began with 
Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988), who noted that pressure-insensitive 
institutional investors are more likely to discipline and/or vote against 
management than pressure-sensitive ones. Borokhovich et al. (2000) find that the 
relative holdings of these two groups of institutional investors affect the market 
reaction to announcements of anti-takeover amendments. 
In the same manner Cornett, Marcus, Saunders and Terhranian (2005) found 
results consistent with the above and concludes that there is a relation between 
institutional investor involvement in a firm and its operating cash flow returns. 
Specifically, they found a significant positive relation between the percent of 
institutional stock ownership and operating cash flow returns and, even more 
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strongly, between the number of institutional investors holding stock in a firm and 
operating cash flow returns. However, the positive relation between the number of 
institutional investors holding stock and operating cash flow returns was found 
only for pressure-insensitive institutional investors (those with no business 
relation with the firm).  
 
2.5 Institutional Investors and corporate governance 
Corporate governance has recently received much attention due to Adelphia, 
Enron, WorldCom, and other high profile scandals, serving as the impetus to such 
recent U.S. regulations as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, considered to be the 
most sweeping corporate governance regulation in the past 70 years, and 
enhancing the long standing bandwagon for increasing shareholder power, 
according to Huyghebaert & Hulle (2004), corporate governance concerns the 
development of performing top structures in corporate organization. One of the 
important dimensions of corporate governance is the creation of effective 
monitoring of managers, voting by shareholders is a legal exercise for monitoring 
and electing the board of directors, these directors are responsible for monitoring 
management, and if there are institutional investors and being dissatisfied with 
firm's performance they have three choices one: use the old "wall street rule" to 
sell their shares, second: hold their shares and voice their dissatisfaction, third: 
hold their shares and do nothing. Recently many questions have been raised if 
institutional investors should be assigned to an influential role in corporate 
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governance; the idea is that they are in a better position to monitor compared to 
small investors due to their size of investment and voting power. 
During the past decades, institutional investors, such as pension funds, insurance 
companies and mutual funds, have become increasingly important as 
shareholders: the combined financial assets hold by institutional investors in the 
major industrialized countries rose from 38% of GDP in 1981 to 90% in 1991 and 
to 144% in 1999 (Gompers and Metrick, 2001). There are two views about 
institutional investors activism, the one is "active monitoring". States that 
institutional investors are expected to exercise an active role to protect the value 
of their investment, including monitoring the performance of the firms in which 
they invest (Monks and Minow, 2001). The opposite view is represented by the 
“passive monitoring” hypothesis, which states that institutional investors do not 
tend to be active in monitoring management, for example because of free-riding 
behavior of certain institutional investors that could make it difficult to take 
collective action. 
On the other hand, a study was conducted by David and Kochhar (1996), they 
argue that various institutional obstacles, such as barriers derived from business 
relationships, the regulatory environment and information processing limitations, 
may interrupt institutional investors from exercising their corporate governance 
role. Leech (2000) argues that many institutional shareholders do not seek control 
over companies in which they invest for many reasons, which include the fear of 
obtaining price sensitive information, so institutional investors are more likely to 
influence rather than complete control. Moreover, it has also been argued, in line 
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with the “passive monitoring” view, that institutional investors do not tend to 
“exit” on their investments ( sell their equity stakes when the firm is not 
functioning well), mainly because they hold large portion of equity and not to 
negatively affect stock prices and further increase any potential loss.  
Downes, Houminer & Hubbard (1999), conclude the following important points 
on the impact of institutional investors on corporate governance,  
• All institutional investors have improved their efforts at proxy analysis and 
voting in recent years by developing in-house proxy-administration 
departments and employing voting services and consulting firms such as 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) or the Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC). 
• And though investors may refer to “corporate governance” in their 
monitoring and intervention, informal or formal investor actions relate far 
more frequently to perceptions of poor performance. Except in highly 
publicized cases involving allegations of excessive executive 
compensation, dysfunctional boards, or fraud, it is generally only after 
firms are identified as troubled or as long-term underperformers that 
governance practices are given more than routine scrutiny. 
• Institutional investors view good governance as most valuable when a firm 
or its industry is in trouble. Despite differing views on the general value of 
good governance practices. 
• While many commentators note that “private mutual-fund” and “pension-
fund” institutional investors differ in their assessments about both the 
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costs and the benefits of shareholder activism, they find that this difference 
is less clear than it might appear at first glance. Many institutional 
investors themselves are skeptical of institutional investor activism.  
 
2.6 Influence of institutional investors 
Given the size of their shareholdings the power of the institutional investors 
cannot be doubted. In his influential work, Hirschman (1970) identified the 
exercise of institutional power within an ‘exit and voice, means that if institutional 
investors are dissatisfied, they either sell their shares (exit) or exercise their power 
through effective voting. The former choice is not viable for many institutional 
investors given the size of their holdings or a policy of holding a balanced 
portfolio. 
 Greenbury (1995) report that the main action points that ‘the investor institutions 
should use their power and influence to ensure the implementation of best practice 
as set out in the Code. The institutional investors’ potential to exert significant 
influence on companies has clear implications for corporate governance, 
especially in terms of the standards of corporate governance and issues concerned 
with enforcement. In relation to institutional shareholders, the Combined Code 
(2006) principles of good governance state: 
Dialogue with companies 
 Institutional shareholders should enter into a dialogue with companies based on 
the mutual understanding of objectives. 
Evaluation of governance disclosures 
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 When evaluating companies’ governance arrangements, particularly those 
relating to board structure and composition, institutional investors should give 
due weight to all relevant factors drawn to their attention. 
Shareholder voting 
 Institutional shareholders have a responsibility to make considered use of their 
votes. 
Some institutional investors formulate their own code and principles of corporate 
governance.  
The Institutional Shareholders' Committee (ISC) which is composed from the 
Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the National Association of pension 
Funds (NAPF), the Association of Investment Trustee Companies (NITC), and 
the Investment management Association (IMA) issued a code of practices for 
institutional investors to exercise their activism procedures in the case of poor- 
performing investee companies whether to voice or exit, and according to Mallin 
& Runall (2006), the ISC recommends that institutional investors should have a 
clear statement of their policy on activism and on how they will discharge 
their responsibilities. The policy would be a public document and would cover 
the following areas: how investee companies will be monitored; the policy for 
requiring investee companies’ compliance with the Combined Code; the policy 
for meeting with an investee company’s board and senior management; how any 
conflicts of interest will be dealt with; the strategy on intervention; indication of 
when and how further action may be taken; and the policy on voting. 
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They also recommend that institutional investors should monitor performance. 
Monitoring performance should be on regular basis that include important 
practices for good governance that must be clearly communicable and checked 
periodically for its effectiveness. It would include reviewing annual reports and 
accounts, circulars and resolutions; and attending company meetings. In 
particular, institutional shareholders should try to satisfy themselves that the 
investee company’s board and sub-committee structures are effective; that 
independent directors provide adequate oversight; and maintain a clear audit trail 
of their meetings and of votes cast on company resolutions, in particular 
contentious issues.  
The ISC argue that institutional investors intervene when necessary for the 
important company issues including the company’s strategy; its operational 
performance; its acquisition/disposal strategy; independent directors failing to 
hold executive management properly to account; internal controls failing; 
inadequate succession planning; an unjustifiable failure to comply with the 
Combined Code; inappropriate remuneration packages; and the company’s 
approach to corporate social responsibility. Boards should be given the chance to 
ensure their good reaction but if they do not, and then institutional investors may 
use their right and actions to change the board in the general or extraordinary 
meeting by joining with other institution. Finally, institutional investors should 
evaluate and report on the outcomes of their shareholder activism. 
Referring to Millin & Runall (2006), corporate governance may be used as a tool 
for adding value for shareholders from under-valued companies. It has been very 
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successful for large institutional investors in the world. In addition they added that 
corporate governance may also be used as an essential factor to help restore 
investor and improve confidence in markets which have experienced financial 
troubles. This is proved in the last few years in Malaysia, Japan, and Russia. 
 Numerous studies have made the point that institutional shareholders may have 
potential costs (Coffee, Jr., 1991; Bolton and Von Thadden, 1998; Maug, 1998; 
La Porta et al., 1999), first, large shareholders may practice private gains at the 
expense of small shareholders or of other interested parties such as management, 
employees and other providers of capital such as bondholders. Thus, for example, 
high managerial ownership of the firm may lead to the entrenchment of 
management, as its goal becomes to maximize its own private benefits 
(“entrenchment” effect). This effect could also occur in case of an entrenched 
controlling owner, such as an institutional investor, who may deprive minority 
shareholders of their rights. Second, regarding the “entrenchment” effect, the 
considerable control enjoyed by large shareholders may lead to handle intangible 
benefits, like status and political influence, which can be defined as “private 
benefits” of control (Morck et al., 2005). Third, large shareholders bear 
additional risk by putting all their investments in limited number of firms, 
although, as has been demonstrated, the existence of a liquid stock market reduces 
the costs of holding large equity stakes (Maug, 1998). Thus, there is a trade-off 
between liquidity and control, so the liquidity of their investments would be at the 
expense of the control of the firms in which they invest (Coffee, Jr., 1991; Bolton 
and von Thadden, 1988). Furthermore, when large shareholders exist, small 
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shareholders may get out of their monitoring responsibilities that bring them in a 
“free-riding” problem. 
2.7 Indirect Monitoring  
Gilson & Kraakman (1991) find that institutional investors’ incentives push 
against direct involvement in portfolio companies’ management. Therefore, 
indirect monitoring through the board of directors or trade groups and informal 
communication between corporate managers and institutional investors are the 
corner stone of institutional voice. Indirect monitoring can be achieved, inter-alia, 
by encouraging or funding block-holding funds who will bear the legal risks 
involved in holding large percentage stakes. An example of this form of indirect 
monitoring is the emergence of "white squire" funds, funded mainly by 
institutions, with the stated goal of acquiring large equity stakes that will give 
them both the incentive and the ability to monitor company managers. Yet another 
avenue of indirect monitoring is block-holding by a single institution that has 
developed a reputation for not abusing power and for promoting the interests of 
shareholders as a group.  
Pinto.M (2006) also argues that the need to aggregate power across institutions 
has led some institutions to rely on trade groups and independent advisors to 
coordinate governance initiatives. These organizations give voting advice; 
develop opinion papers on governance issues. Trade groups can also develop lists 
of director candidates and criteria for assessing director performance. Today, the 
ISS is the world's leading provider of proxy voting and corporate governance 
services.  
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2.8 Institutional Investors and Information Asymmetries 
Akerlof (1970) was one of the important researchers who pinpoint the area of 
information asymmetry and argues that asymmetric information leads to price 
discounts. Using the example of the used car market, Akerlof shows that rational 
buyers understand that they are up against sellers that are better informed about 
the intrinsic quality of the cars put up for sale. As a result, they will only offer to 
buy at prices reflecting the fact that lower quality owners are most likely to be the 
ones that are prepared to sell. If asymmetric information is important, the discount 
may become so large that good quality sellers are driven out of the market and 
only the lowest quality owners remain willing to trade. 
 Huyghebaert. N and Hulle. C (2004), argue that adverse selection is one of the 
out put of asymmetric information and it is a well-known phenomenon in 
financial markets. When stock prices are low, managers and company insiders 
often complain that their firm cannot issue new shares to finance its investments 
because the market cannot be convinced that it underestimates the true value of 
the firm. Convincing the market is not easy, because outside investors understand 
that they are up against better informed agents that have an interest in claiming 
that the share price is too low, even if this is not the case. 
Therefore overall, information asymmetries tend to have an inverse effect on the 
stock price of good performing companies. Consequently, firms may invest in 
reducing information asymmetries to increase their stock prices. 
Different theoretical models show how this may actually arise. These models 
generally assign a role to institutional investors. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) 
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start out from the logic that a reduction in information asymmetries lowers the 
cost of capital and that companies that can benefit most will invest more strongly 
in reducing such asymmetries. In their model, the decline in the cost of capital is 
caused by the fact that better information attracts more large investors (such as 
institutional owners) as less information asymmetries enhance every-day liquidity. 
Clearly, there is a relation between information asymmetry and stock liquidity. 
Similarly, in a capital market with incomplete information, Merton (1987) shows 
that stock prices are positively affected by the number of institutional investors 
realizing the firm's stock. This view could explain why larger, hence most of the 
time also better-known firms attract more investors and institutional investors in 
particular. 
A trend in research is linking the asymmetric information and the book-building; 
which is a method, through which the selling price of a large block of shares is 
determined, developed in the US and now is being used in other countries 
especially in the marketing of the IPOs. In essence, it involves asking professional 
investors how many shares they are willing to buy and at what price. On the basis 
of this information, the firm and its investment bankers determine the IPO’s 
offering price. The method uses the fact that compared to small retail investors; 
professionals generally are better able to evaluate the true worth of a firm. Cohen 
et al. (2002) find empirical support for this assumption. Based on the fact that 
institutional investors have more ability to evaluate information & cash flows, 
then better evaluate the stock. So, comparing to the earlier discussed studies of 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) and Merton (1987), as information asymmetries 
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reduced, institutional investors are better off and that overall enhance stock 
liquidity, in this context the literature hypothesizes that the book-building 
procedure  actually contribute in reducing information asymmetries, and then 
increase the value of the stock. 
 Actually, there are two stages in the book-building process, the first was 
discussed earlier, and the second stage, allow small investors to subscribe at the 
price determined in stage one. And this price should be reduced for small 
investors when it reflects the amount that sophisticated investors are willing to 
pay in that stock. However, for book-building to work in practice, the IPO-firm 
needs to give professional investors an incentive to invest in information 
collection and then truthfully reveal their opinion; by reducing the subscription 
price below the actual value of the firm. So, by doing that, subscribers earn 
positive returns compared to buying in the after-market which is referred to under 
pricing that may reach to an average 15%, then the stock will be more demanded. 
So that practice reflects the irrationality by some institutional investors who bade 
higher price during the book-building period. This logic has been developed in 
detail in Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), Welch 
(1991), Cornelli and Goldreich (2001). It is also supported empirically. Indeed, as 
predicted by these models, institutional investors collect valuable information and 
prove to be able to do better than small investors at the time of an IPO (Aggarwal 
et al. (2002)). 
 (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002); Keloharju and Torstila (2002) show that 
professionals intend to collect less information when they do not benefit from 
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engagement. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) also show that IPO-firms benefit 
from the book-building process by reducing the under-pricing.  
The above results show how capital markets can benefit from the involvement of 
institutional investors especially for firms face important information 
asymmetries, like high growth firms that are hard to value. Arosio et al. (2001) 
and Huyghebaert and Van Hulle (2002) in fact they find that since the 
introduction of book-building in Continental Europe in the second half of the 
nineties, firms with high financing requirements dominate the firms going public, 
by using book-building, organizing road shows abroad and dealing with high 
sound foreign investment banks in the marketing of securities. On the other hand, 
despite the merits of the book-building, we shouldn't forget some adverse effect; 
the method has been a source of conflicts of interest between firms and small 
shareholders on the one hand and the advising investment bankers and 
professional investors on the other hand. Aggarwal et al. (2002) show for IPOs in 
the U.S. that investment bankers reward their good institutional clients with 
deeply under-priced issues, significantly in excess of what could be explained by 
compensation in exchange for the service of information gathering. But 
investment bankers justify that with other promises by institutional investors not 
to immediately sell shares in the aftermarket, or even buy shares if selling 
pressure would occur shortly after the IPO. This conflict of interest may be clearly 
noticed in Europe as many institutional investors are subsidiaries of financial 
institutions that are engaged in investment banking services. Consistent with this 
idea, greater information asymmetry is found in the aftermarket as the commercial 
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bank acts as underwriter in an IPO, Hebb and MacKinnon (2004). This 
asymmetry resolves itself over time as the market learns more about each issue so 
that it becomes clear which ones may have involved a conflict of interest on the 
part of the commercial bank.  
2.9 Institutional investors' Impact on Stock liquidity 
Liquidity, how fast assets can be converted into cash or the ability to satisfy short-
term obligations, so it is directly related to value. And share price is negatively 
affected by deficiency in liquidity by three ways. First of all, the uncertainty 
about the true value of stock increases if a stock is not regularly traded (Merton 
(1987). One of the main features of stock markets is that, when investors receive 
information regarding a specific share and act upon it, the information becomes 
reflected into the stock price. Therefore as stock is not regularly traded, the less 
opportunity for information to be (timely) incorporated into share price, and the 
more uncertainty about the stock’s underlying value. Furthermore, investors are 
not attracted to buy a stock with low liquidity because they are concern about the 
exit point, so that overall information collection tends to decline. Finally, 
investors holding an illiquid stock find it difficult to get rid of it because there is 
no other demanding party, so they will be borne a cost in the form of price 
discounts. Consequently, as uncertainty about the underlying value increases, less 
investors are interested to buy it and as trading becomes more costly, the share 
price decreases and that would increase the cost of capital. 
Although there is no perfect agreement yet about how the exact impact of the 
above factors on value, there is a harmony in the literature that liquidity has an 
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impact on share prices. For example, Eleswarapu and Reingaum (1993), Brennan 
and Subrahmanyam (1996), Eckbo and Norli (2000) provide evidence that stock 
market liquidity is reflected in asset returns. Specifically, investors require higher 
rate of return on illiquid stocks that is reflected in higher cost of equity from the 
issuer's view. The impact of liquidity on value was a major focus for many 
researchers, Loderer and Roth (2003) report that the least liquid stocks on Nasdaq 
and the Swiss Exchange suffer a discount on value of about 30%. And Butler et 
al. (2002) show in the US, companies with highly liquid shares experience less 
issuance costs when they raise new share capital and sell these additional shares in 
the market. 
Although, there is a common view that stock liquidity is also affected by the type 
of investors holding it especially when we talk about companies count for 
institutional investors in their stockholders' structure, their stock tends to be more 
liquid than other stocks with no institutional investors in the shareholders' base. 
Of course, institutional investors have a preference for liquid shares (Gompers and 
Metrick (1998)). Institutional investors view liquidity as a valuable element when 
they rebalance their portfolios over time. Conversely, liquidity is improved 
because institutional investors involve in more information gathering than small 
retail investors. Supporting this idea, Bennett et al. (2003) report that when 
institutional investors invest in small firms ‘greener pastures’, they increase the 
stock liquidity of these firms by demanding more information. However, when 
institutional investors trade the company's stock they may affect the price and the 
  
35
cost of equity by reducing the tax liability on the company and its investors if the 
company operates under different tax brackets.   
Furthermore, Redding (1997) shows in a theoretical model that publicly quoted 
firms tend to pay more dividends when institutional investors pay low tax on 
received dividends, higher cash disbursements to investors imply less opportunity 
for overspending by management, which may positively affect the quality of the 
firm’s governance. On the other side, there is a claim says that trading by 
institutional investors contribute to greater stock price variability due to the large 
amounts of stocks traded while these investors rebalancing their portfolios. That 
such rebalancing indeed may have important effects reflected in the stock prices 
of firms that are included in an important stock market index. As institutional 
investors commonly have a preference for index stocks, the entry to or exit from 
the index may change the ownership structure of the firm included in the index. 
Shleifer & Veshny (1986) and Denis et al. (2003), among others, prove that this 
practice significantly affects the company’s stock price. Whether or not 
institutional investors actually cause greater stock price variability is as yet not 
clear. Other findings by Bushee and Noe (2000) indicate that for the U.S. the 
existence of these institutionals does not affect return volatility. However, some 
institutional investors such as momentum traders and hedge funds tend to trade 
more aggressively, and these professionals may induce more volatility. For 
Poland, Bohl and Brzeszczynski (2004) prove that when the Polish pension 
system has been reformed in 1999, and when it was allowed for the privately 
pension fund to invest in stock market especially index stocks, institutionalism 
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have become a major investor group. Since then, at least for index stocks, return 
volatility has decreased. Also, Abarbanell et al. (2003) find that the rebalancing of 
institutional portfolios after a firm spins off a subsidiary does not create price 
volatility in the firm’s stock. At the same time, the findings of Welker and Sparks 
(2001) show that at the time public companies disclose information, institutional 
investors reacts normally. However, Potter (1992) and Sias (1996) provide 
evidence that higher institutional ownership is associated with higher stock price 
volatility. The findings in Badrinath and Wahal (2002) imply that the impact on 
volatility depends on the type of trading decision: to enter a new stock, 
institutional investors act as momentum traders, and hence may contribute to 
volatility, but when they exit or make adjustments to ongoing holdings, they 
behave as contrarian traders. Overall, most research indicates that institutional 
investors positively influence liquidity. However, from the findings it is also clear 
that further work is needed as the type of professional investors and their trading 
strategies have a diverse impact on the behavior of stock prices. 
 
2.10 The Palestinian context 
The Palestine Securities Exchange (PSE), in Nablus, was incorporated as a private 
shareholding company in early 1995, with the Palestine Development & 
Investment Company (PADICO) and (SAMED) as its major investors. 
After the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) approved a PADICO-sponsored 
design and work plan in July 1995, a project team was put together by the PSE 
and entrusted to establish a fully electronic exchange and depository. EFA 
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Software Services, a Canadian company, provided both the trading and settlement 
& clearing systems. By August 1996 the Exchange was fully operational, and on 
November 7th of that year the PSE signed an operating agreement with the PNA, 
allowing for the licensing and qualification of brokerage firms to take place. On 
February 18, 1997, the PSE conducted its first trading session. 
In 2006 the number of companies increased from 28 to 33, with the addition of six 
new companies and the de-listing of one company. A plan to offer 40% of the 
PSE’s shares to the public was not successful, but it was not discarded. PADICO 
attempted to sell 50% of its stake in the PSE, which accounts for 40% of the 
PSE’s total capital, but the attempt failed because of legislative delays. Trading on 
the Exchange has been volatile, as trading volume witnessed periods of extremely 
thin and heavy trading. The 2006 Average Daily Trading Volume (ADTV) 
dropped 37.9% to 0.94 million shares, compared to 1.50 million shares in 2005, 
and the Average Daily Trading Value (ADTVa) dropped 49.1% to US$4.48 
million, compared to US$8.52 million for the same period. Over the year 2006, 
the PSE lost 38.8% of its market capitalization to close at US$2.73 billion. The 
Al-Quds Index lost 46.39% to close at 605 points, 
Thirty-six shareholding companies have been approved for listing so far, with 
additional companies expected to be listed in the future. The current list of 
companies spans a wide range of sectors, including banking, insurance, 
pharmaceuticals, utilities, telecommunications and investment. There are currently 
an estimated 40 Palestinian companies eligible to be listed on the Exchange, with 
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a market capitalization of over $1 billion USD. Shares of listed companies are 
mostly traded in Jordanian Dinars, while some are traded in US Dollars. 
The Exchange, often known as the Nablus Securities Exchange, felled from a 
daily turnover of $12 million in 2005 to about $6 million "on a good day" in 2007. 
At the same time the value of the 36 companies traded on the PSE decreased from 
a combined value of $4.5 billion to $2.8 billion over the same period. The year 
2005 was a unique rear when  Al-Quds index reached 1128 points.  
The Exchange launched an e-trading portal on April 24, 2007, to allow investors 
to buy and sell stocks over the internet. 
PSE, the Capital Market Authority (CMA), and other regulatory bodies are 
coordinating efforts to attract foreign institutional investors to Palestine by 
enforcing effective disclosure, regulations and corporate governance that 
contribute to developing investment environment in Palestine.  
Almost no literature was written about the size and impact of institutional 
investors in Palestine due to the newly established securities market and the new 
trend in institutional investment especially the foreign one, so this will be an 
exploratory descriptive research. Very few studies were conducted concerning 
corporate governance and efficiency at the PSE, one of them was conducted by 
(Abdelkarim, Alawneh, 2007), this study relates corporate governance and 
performance for companies listed at the PSE by considering ownership 
concentration as one of governance dimensions for the years 2005 & 2006, they 
found that financial performance is negatively correlated to ownership 
concentration that weakens the corporate governance and market efficiency at all, 
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they reported that Palestinian listed companies have ownership concentration that 
affects information disclosure and transparency that have an inverse impact on 
governance.    
Based on the literature, this study will focus on a set of variables that will be 
tested thorough empirical testing using regression analysis. The following 
hypotheses explain the idea more clearly. 
2.11 Hypotheses  
Based on the literature review questions that the study attempts to address, the 
following hypotheses were developed. We try to investigate if there is a 
relationship between the number of institutional investors holding the stock and 
the financial performance of investee companies measured by Tobin's q. 
H0: There is statistically insignificant relationship between number of 
institutional     investors and the corporate performance measured by Tobin's q. 
H1:  There is statistically significant relationship between number of 
institutional investors and the corporate performance measured by Tobin's q. 
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3 CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY & 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
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3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodologies used to achieve the objectives of the 
study, and it's important to clarify the overall research approach, since this 
approach might influence the results of the study. Dependent on different kinds of 
research issues, various types of research methods can be used. Referring to a 
source of research procedure, "research methodology can be conceived as a 
system of rules and procedures. Such rules and procedures are important in 
research for the purpose of reasoning i.e a specific logic to acquire insights, inter-
subjectivity i.e reporting how the research has obtained the findings and 
communication i.e reporting in a manner to enable others to replicate or 
criticize…" (Ghauri, Gronhaug, Kristaianslund, 1995). We have chosen to use 
descriptive data analysis and empirical testing using regression model to assess 
the impact of institutional investors on financial performance based on cross-
sectional analysis. To clearly state methodologies used also gives credibility and 
trustworthiness to the study.  
Through investigating the impact of institutional investors on corporate 
performance, this study should answer the following question 
1. Does the involvement by institutional investors have an impact on 
corporate financial performance? 
2. Is there a difference between the involvement of whole number of 
institutional investors and board member institutional investors? 
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3.2 Study Procedures 
This study is composed of three main processes: 
1. Preliminary data collection through preliminary readings about the subject 
and a literature review was made to stand on the previous writings about 
the impact of institutional investors on investee companies though 
reviewing different issues of governance and performance. 
2. Research design and methodology through using scientific tools to have 
the study questions been answered, using regression model. 
3. The final stage is the discussion of research results to conclude 
recommendations. 
 
3.3  Regression Model and Definition of variable 
First of all, we can express the regression model by the following equation, 
Q = α + β1debt + β2NIG + β3IR + β4NII + е 
Where  α is the vertical intercept, β is the regression coefficients and e is the error 
term.  
Dependent variable: Tobin's q: is on of the popular measures of corporate 
financial performance, it is calculated as (market capitalization divided by 
corporate net worth). A ratio devised by James Tobin of Yale University, Nobel 
laureate in economics, who hypothesized that the combined market value of all 
the companies on the stock market should be about equal to their replacement 
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costs. The Q ratio is calculated as the market value of a company divided by the 
replacement value or (net worth) of the firm's assets: 
Q = market value of firm / corporate net worth 
For example, a low Q (between 0 and 1) means that the cost to replace a 
firm's assets is greater than the value of its stock. This implies that the stock is 
undervalued. Conversely, a high Q (greater than 1) implies that a firm's stock is 
more expensive than the replacement cost of its assets, which implies that the 
stock is overvalued. This measure of stock valuation is the driving factor behind 
investment decisions in Tobin's model. (www.investopedia.com). 
The following figure is the theoretical framework of the study, 
  
 
Figure 1: theoretical framework 
    Independent variables                                                        Dependent variable  
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Independent variables 
IR: is the institutional investors represented on the board of the investee company. 
NII: is the whole number of institutional investors holding a particular stock in 
specific year. 
Control variables 
Debt: is measured as (total debt / total assets). It is a measure of firm's 
indebtedness, the proportion of the investments financed by debt, finance 
literature revealed that this variable have some impact on firm's value. we can 
note here that debt variable in this study is taken as total liabilities over total 
assets, because almost no long-term debt used by Palestinian companies.  
NIG:  Net Income Growth = (NIt – NIt-1) / NIt-1 is the growth in net income after 
tax between the two years. 
3.4 Sample of the study      
The sample for the regression model were 22 randomly selected PSE listed 
companies, four of them were dropped because of the lack of information and 
newly listed firms, with giving an attention for selecting companies that have 
available information in the period of the study. A cross-sectional regression 
analysis is used to asses the impact of the existence of institutional investors on 
corporate financial performance measured by Tobin;s q. Running the cross-
sectional regression in three years 2005, 2006 & 2007. Data for regression 
variables were obtained from the PSE year book 2006, corporate annual reports 
for regression variables in 2007, and PSE website. 
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For the purpose to achieve the research objectives, this study followed scientific 
approach to assess the impact of institutional investors on corporate performance 
in the Palestinian listed companies in terms of the number of institutional 
investors as one of the governance issues. This study is considered a descriptive, 
exploratory and quantitative based research to describe the characteristics of the 
variables of interest in a certain situation using empirical testing with regression 
model. 
Regression model is used to as an explanatory tool to establish correlations 
between a number of variables. In this particular thesis, the explanatory part is 
presented through the relationship between the involvement by institutional 
investors and the Tobin's q (M/B as a measure of performance) to answer the 
question "is there an impact of the existence of institutional investors on corporate 
financial performance"? 
 
3.5 Data Collection 
Data collection is one of the important parts in the research process by which the 
researcher can accumulate empirical data as a base to formulate his particular 
research theoretical framework. 
Here, in this research we chose to use quantitative approach for collecting primary 
data using empirical testing by regression analysis. The following is a detail for 
collecting secondary & primary data. 
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Secondary Data  
 Secondary data which refers to the literature review is an important part in data 
collection phase in order to formulate a conceptual view of what has been written 
about the research problem and it helps to use the appropriate methodology. 
Regarding this study, it depended on corporate annual reports for companies 
under investigation listed on the PSE and also depended on PSE 2006 report for 
Palestinian listed companies, to get the variables to run the regression. 
Articles are important source for literature; it was also used to explain the most 
important concepts regarding the topic and to accumulate knowledge that helps in 
developing the theoretical framework. 
Primary Data 
 In order to capture the impact of institutional investors on corporate performance, 
the empirical testing will be used through regression analysis. A cross-sectional 
analysis for three years will be conducted for 18 selected companies listed on the 
PSE. This regression is to investigate the correlation between institutional 
investors and corporate performance measured by Tobin's q as a dependent 
variable and number of institutional investors holding a particular stock & 
institutional investors represented on board as independent variables and as 
corporate governance issues, other independent control variables that seem to 
affect the dependent variable will be used also, these control variables are debt 
measured by (total debt / total assets), and the net income growth measured as the 
percentage change in net income between two years. More details about the 
variables, justification for use, analysis and results will be discussed in the next 
chapter (data results & analysis). 
  
47
It is important to note that not only institutional investors represented on board 
were considered, but all of them since that there may be institutional investors 
who are influential but not represented on board.    
 
In this thesis we use two independent variables to investigate the impact of 
institutional investors' involvement. The first is the whole number of institutionals 
who are investing in a particular stock. The second is the number of institutionals 
represented on the board of the investee company. The second one is used to 
measure the impact of institutional shareholders on performance of investee 
companies, since they hold significant shares that they can influence management 
decision and better ability to monitors top management and other board members, 
then improve performance. It's important to answer the question, who watches the 
watchers? This is the role of institutional investor set on board to watch other 
board members and management. Here is to distinguish between the impact of the 
whole institutional investors and the institutional investors represented on boards, 
and do the institutional investors represented on board of the investee company 
really improve performance? 
It is important to mention here that large institutional investors are taken as the 
representation on board rather than investors holding more than 5% of firm's 
capital or top ten institutional investors for two reasons, the first is that they have 
better ability to monitor performance and in general they couldn't set on board 
unless they hold a significant portion of shares, the second is the lack of 
information about the ownership distribution for the listed companies in Palestine 
before 2007. 
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Finally, we were preparing to classify institutional investors as indicated in the 
finance literature that represents financial institutions which includes mutual 
funds, pension funds, banks, and insurance companies, but the limitation of small 
size market of Palestine and the absence of that classification on the PSE database 
have limited my work in this thesis, as a result we generalized the definition of 
institutional investors to include financial institutions and other corporate 
investors.   
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4 CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS & ANALYSIS 
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4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the results of the empirical studies will be discussed and analyzed 
with the connection of the theoretical framework. I will also add my results with 
discussion with other studies.  
This chapter will be classified into two main parts; the first discusses the size of 
institutional investors in the Palestine Securities Exchange. 
 The second attempts to answer the question regarding the relationship between 
institutional investors and corporate performance measured by Tobin's q by 
empirical testing using cross-sectional regression analysis.  
Part one: that deals with the size of institutional investors in Palestinian market, a 
set of data has been collected from the PSE annual report for Palestinian listed 
companies, these data have been integrated in a meaningful manner that help for 
better understanding their relative size, and a table has been developed 
summarizing their percentage holding in the PSE listed companies (see appendix). 
As of April 27 2008, the total percentage holding by institutional investors in 
Palestinian listed companies reached 53 % which represents 1162.3 millions JD as 
indicated in the table (20, appendix)), which can be classified into local 
institutional investors account for 20.4 % of total market capitalization in that date 
which represents 446.7 millions JD, and foreign institutional investors with a total 
percentage holding reached 32.6 % of total market capitalization that represents 
715.7 millions JD. 
As indicated above, institutional investors hold a significant percentage of total 
market, so they can have a significant role to affect the investee companies. What 
  
51
they really do to affect corporate governance and performance; this is what we 
will see in the next two parts of the analysis. 
Part two: the second part tries to answer if there is a relationship between 
institutional investors and corporate performance. The measures of institutional 
investor ownership follow those used in Hartzell and Starks (2003). I find the total 
number of institutional investors holding a particular stock and the other is the 
number of institutional investors represented on Investee company's board for 
three consecutive years 2005, 2006, and 2007. Another measure was used which 
was the percentage holding of a particular stock by institutional investors,  but it 
seemed to be the same as the representation on board, and the correlation matrices 
revealed a high correlation between them, as a result, the percentage holding 
variable was omitted. Other control variables were omitted as a result of 
multicollinearity and immaterial impact on the dependent variable like sales 
growth, market value of the investee company, and other variables.   
I estimate a multivariate regression in which Tobin's q in each year is a function 
of various corporate variables. My particular focus is the impact of the number of 
institutional investors on performance. I run a regression for the three years 2005, 
2006 & 2007 separately for 18 observations in each year. Consistent and 
significant findings were found in 2005 & 2006 about the relationship between the 
number if institutional investors and performance. 
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4.2 Regression Results 
4.2.1 2005 Analysis 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 2005 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Market to Book 18 .51 6.81 2.2778 1.60129 
Debt  18 3.0 85.0 31.611 23.2737 
Number of 
institutionals 18 5 143 38.61 42.932 
Net income growth 18 -195 3340 503.83 1020.061 
Representation on 
board 18 0 13 5.78 3.889 
Valid N (list wise) 18     
 
Table 3: Correlations matrix 2005 
  
Market 
to Book 
Number of 
institutionals
Net 
income 
growth
Representation 
on board Debt 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 .651(**) -.133 -.073 .018 
Sig. (2-
tailed) . .003 .599 .775 .944 
Market to 
Book 
N 18 18 18 18 18 
Pearson 
Correlation .651(**) 1 -.132 .389 -.046 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .003 . .600 .110 .856 
Number of 
institutionals 
N 18 18 18 18 18 
Pearson 
Correlation -.133 -.132 1 .047 .191 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .599 .600 . .852 .447 
Net income 
growth 
N 18 18 18 18 18 
Pearson 
Correlation -.073 .389 .047 1 -.033 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .775 .110 .852 . .897 
Representation 
on board 
N 18 18 18 18 18 
Pearson 
Correlation .018 -.046 .191 -.033 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .944 .856 .447 .897 . 
Debt 
N 18 18 18 18 18 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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For the correlation matrix shown in table (3) for 2005, we can say that the only 
significant correlation is between number of institutional investors and corporate 
performance measured by Tobin's q, this relationship shows a correlation 
coefficient 0.65 with 0.003 significance at 1% significance level. These results are 
enforced by 2006 results. So in the two years 2005 & 2006, there is a significance 
correlation between the whole number of institutional investors and corporate 
performance. 
 
Table 4: Model Summary 2005 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .742(a) .551 .413 1.22689 
a  Predictors: (Constant), Representation on board, Debt, Net income growth, Number of institutionals 
 
Table 5: ANOVA(b) 
Model  
Sum of 
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regressi
on 24.022 4 6.005 3.990 .025(a) 
Residual 19.568 13 1.505   
1 
Total 43.590 17    
a  Predictors: (Constant), Representation on board, Debt, Net income growth, # of institutionals 
b  Dependent Variable: Market to Book 
 
Table 6: Coefficients(a) 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model  B Std. Error Beta T Sig. 
(Constant) 1.949 .688  2.834 .014 
Net income 
growth .000 .000 -.018 -.093 .927 
Number of 
institutionalism .030 .008 .799 3.908 .002 
Debt .003 .013 .046 .242 .813 
1 
Representation 
on board -.157 .084 -.381 -1.878 .083 
a  Dependent Variable: Market to Book 
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Looking to 2005 regression results, We can say that there is a moderate 
exploratory power for the whole regression, but still significant. Adjusted R2 = 
41%, means that only 41% of changes in the market value of Palestinian listed 
companies are due to changes in all exploratory variables (debt, whole number of 
institutional investors, number of institutionals represented on board, and net 
income growth). So we can accept the exploratory power of the whole regression 
as long as F-statistics is below 0.05, and it is 0.025. as a result we reject the null 
hypothesis (H0) and accept the alternate one (H1) that says: There is statistically 
significant relationship between number of institutional investors and the 
corporate performance measured by Tobin's q. 
Moving to the coefficients table which shows the importance of each independent 
variable in the explaining the changes in the dependent variable. The most 
important influential exploratory variable is the whole number of institutional 
investors, we can see a positive significant relationship between the whole number 
of institutional invertors holding a particular stock and market to book value as a 
measure of performance, the regression coefficient is 0.03 and 0.002 significance. 
These consecutive results shows the importance of the number of institutional 
investors holding the stock, and it is enforced by the negative but insignificant 
relationship between the number of institutional investors represented on board 
and firm's performance, so it is important to have a large number of institutional 
investors with diluted ownership (to prevent the concentration of ownership) to 
positively affect firm's performance. Number of institutional investors represented 
on board is insignificant; it shows a negative relationship between representation 
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on board and firm's performance with -0.157 regression coefficient with 0,083 
significance. These results can be explained in light of the concentration of 
ownership, when the representation on board by institutionals increase, this would 
be at the expense of the whole number of institutional investors, making one or 
two institutional investors control the board and they may need to be monitored 
by other party. These results reveal that most of Palestinian listed companies are 
controlled by little number of members who are representatives for institutional 
investors, that they become not caring about monitoring management and board.    
The following graph shows the clear relationship between the whole number of 
institutional investors and corporate performance measured by Tobin's q. this 
relationship is significant on both logarithmic and linear calculations, this 
relationship is significant in 2005 and 2006. 
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Curve Fit 2005 
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Figure 2: 2005 regression graph 
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4.2.2 2006 Analysis 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics 2006 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Market to Book 18 .48 2.87 1.4134 .67122 
Debt 18 .0 77.0 29.967 21.6167 
Numberof institutionals 18 4 153 42.17 46.795 
Net income growth 18 -770 1212 53.83 423.570 
Representation on 
board 18 0 13 6.28 3.982 
Valid N (listwise) 18     
 
The above table represents a descriptive statistics for 2006 variables. 18 
observations for each variable. The market to book value variables ranges from 
0.48 to 2.87 times, debt varies from 0 to 77% with 22 standard deviation, which 
means there is a variety in the use of debt by firms in Palestine. A large deviation 
can be noticed in the net income growth variable which ranges from -770% to 
1212% with 423% standard deviation which indicates that there is no earning 
stability for Palestinian firms due to the political and economic instability. 
Number of institutional investors variable ranges from 4 to 153 with 47 standard 
deviation, which means that Palestinian firms vary in there ownership structure 
regarding the involvement of institutional investors. The last one is the number of 
institutionals represented on board of investee companies, which varies from 0 to 
13, from no institutional representation to full representation on board.  
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Table 8: Correlation Matrix 2006 
  
Market 
to Book
Number 
of 
institution
als 
Net 
income 
growth 
Representat
ion on 
board Debt 
Market to Book Pearson 
Correlation 1 .514(*) -.345 -.329 .044 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) . .029 .161 .182 .862 
 N 18 18 18 18 18 
Number of 
institutionals 
Pearson 
Correlation .514(*) 1 -.185 .277 .112 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) .029 . .462 .267 .657 
 N 18 18 18 18 18 
Net income 
growth 
Pearson 
Correlation -.345 -.185 1 -.372 -.227 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) .161 .462 . .129 .366 
 N 18 18 18 18 18 
Representation 
on board 
Pearson 
Correlation -.329 .277 -.372 1 .052 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) .182 .267 .129 . .838 
 N 18 18 18 18 18 
Debt Pearson 
Correlation .044 .112 -.227 .052 1 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) .862 .657 .366 .838 . 
 N 18 18 18 18 18 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
First of all, a preliminary statistics were conducted for the three data sets. For the 
year 2006 running the correlation matrix shown in table (8) reveals the inter-
relations among all variables. There is only one significant correlation among 
variables. It is between the number of institutional investors in a particular stock 
and the corporate performance measured by Tobin's q, the matrix shows a positive 
significant correlation between the two variables, Pearson correlation coefficient 
is 0.51 with 0.029 significance confident at 5% significance level. This can have a 
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reasonable explanation which implies that the increase in the whole number of 
institutional investors with dilution of ownership reduces the probability that large 
institutional shareholders could collaborate with each other to inversely affect 
governance issues that are negatively reflected on performance, and then leads to 
negative impact on share price. When there is a large number of institutional 
investors, it becomes hard for institutional investors and top management to 
control the activities of all other institutionals. So when there is a large number of 
institutionals with de-concentrated ownership, each one would monitor the 
governance and performance in the investee company separately and objectively 
from others. 
This can be ensured by the negative correlation between the number of 
institutional investors represented on board in a particular stock and corporate 
performance. The increase of the number of institutionals represented on the 
board of a particular company would be at the expense of the whole number of 
institutional investors, because they can't set on board unless they hold a 
significant percentage of shares. In general, their holdings are non-tradable shares, 
and this may affect the fair pricing of shares. If one of the institutional investors 
represented on board wants to sell his shares, they most likely be sold for existing 
representative institutional investors without selling on exchange, this act 
increases the ownership concentration that leads to less disclosure, less 
governance, and then weak financial performance. Some finance literature 
indicates that active institutional investors do not set on board and it is not 
necessarily that each institutional set on board must be active in monitoring. 
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Sometimes, the increase in the number of institutionals represented on board 
would be representing the same institutional investor that may change the form of 
ownership to a subsidiary or affiliate of the investor's company, means that less 
monitoring and oversight to top management and to the board of directors of the 
investee company, which would have a negative impact on performance. 
Another perspective to analyze and explain the positive impact of the number of 
institutional investor on performance is the liquidity impact and information 
asymmetries, the large number of institutionals with de-concentrated ownership 
makes the stock more actively traded in the stock market, and the increase of the 
number of sophisticated & well-informed investors would force the stock to be 
traded on its fair value, because no single one institutional can affect the price 
significantly without the existence of the fundamental based information. So, the 
existence of institutional investors will lead to less information asymmetries that 
lead to better and fair pricing of traded securities. In addition, the increase in the 
number of institutional investors minimizes the high prices volatility (which 
results from the concentrated ownership by institutionals), therefore they 
contribute in price stability rather than high volatility. 
The matrix also shows other insignificant relationships among variables, debt has 
a positive insignificant relationship with M/B value with correlation coefficient 
0.044 and 0.86 significance, means that financing with more debt have a weak 
positive impact on  performance.  
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Table 9: step-wise regression, 2006 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Representa
tion on 
board, 
Debt, 
Number of 
institutiona
ls, Net 
income 
growth(a) 
. Enter 
a  All requested variables entered. 
b  Dependent Variable: Market to Book 
 
 
 
Table 10: Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 .846(a) .716 .629 .40904 
a  Predictors: (Constant), Representation on board, Debt, Number of institutionals, Net income growth 
 
Table 11: ANOVA(b) 
Model  
Sum 
of 
Square
s Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 5.484 4 1.371 8.194 .002(a) 
 Residual 2.175 13 .167   
 Total 7.659 17    
a  Predictors: (Constant), Representation on board, Debt, Number of institutionals, Net income growth 
b  Dependent Variable: Market to Book 
 
Table 12: Coefficients(a) 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model  B Std. Error Beta T Sig. 
(Constant) 1.904 .253  7.523 .000 
Net income 
growth -.001 .000 -.508 -3.104 .008 
Number of 
institutionalism .009 .002 .622 4.010 .001 
Debt -.003 .005 -.105 -.692 .501 
1 
Representation 
on board -.115 .028 -.685 -4.182 .001 
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Further more, going to the exploratory power of the regression as whole as shown 
in table (10), for the year 2006, a diagnostic statistics are found by the regression, 
the adjusted R2 is 0.63, this acceptable exploratory power is enforced by the F- 
test with 0.002 significance, so we can say that the model explains 63% of 
changes in dependent variable or 63% of changes in Tobin's q are due to the 
changes in the above independent variables. From the coefficient we can see that 
there are three significant relationships between dependent and independent 
variables, the first significant one is the positive relationship between the number 
of institutional investors and the firm's performance measured by Tobin's q with 
0.009 regression coefficient and 0.001 significance, the second is negative 
significant relationship between net income growth and firm's performance with -
0.001 regression coefficient and 0.008 significance, the third one is the negative 
significant relationship between the number of institutional investors on board and 
performance with -0.115 coefficient and 0.001 significance. These results are 
accepted as long as their significance is below 0.05. These results can be 
explained in light of the weak efficiency of the Palestine Securities Exchange. Its 
important to have a large number of institutional investors, but still there is a lack 
of knowledge among various investors about the good impact of earning growth 
and the market does not distinguish between growing and non-growing 
companies. 
As a result of the above findings for the 2006 regression, we reject the null 
hypothesis (H0) and accept the alternate one (H1) which states that There is 
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statistically significant relationship between number of institutional investors 
and the corporate performance measured by Tobin's q. 
So we can conclude that there a relationship between these significant 
independent variables (number of institutionals, net income growth, and 
institutionals on board) and the market value of Palestinian listed firms, and we 
can express the relationship by the following equation 
Q = 1.904 - 0.001NIG - 0.115IR + 0.009NII  
The following graph represents the relationship between the number of 
institutional investors and corporate performance for 2006; we can see that there 
is a clear positive relationship between the two variables using linear and 
logarithmic math, and the relationship is significant in both curves. 
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Curve fit 2006 
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Figure 3: 2006 regression graph 
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4.2.3 2007 Analysis   
 
Table 13: Correlation Matrix 2007 
  
Market 
to 
Book 
Number of 
institutionals 
Net 
income 
growth 
Representation 
on board Debt 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 .115 -.085 -.338 .466 
Sig. (2-
tailed) . .650 .736 .170 .051 
Market to 
Book 
N 18 18 18 18 18 
Pearson 
Correlation .115 1 -.189 .323 -.020 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .650 . .453 .191 .939 
Number of 
institutionalism 
N 18 18 18 18 18 
Pearson 
Correlation -.085 -.189 1 -.120 -.364 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .736 .453 . .636 .137 
Net income 
growth 
N 18 18 18 18 18 
Pearson 
Correlation -.338 .323 -.120 1 -.029 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .170 .191 .636 . .910 
Representation 
on board 
N 18 18 18 18 18 
Pearson 
Correlation .466 -.020 -.364 -.029 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .051 .939 .137 .910 . 
Debt 
N 18 18 18 18 18 
 
2007 correlation matrix shows no significant correlations among all dependent 
and independent variables. The relationships and correlations in the above 
correlation matrix are in the same direction of 2005 & 2006 impact but are 
insignificant. Number of institutional investors has a positive but insignificant 
correlation with market to book value with 0.115 correlation coefficient and 0.65 
significance. Number of institutionals represented on board also has the same 
direction of impact as in 2005 & 2006; it has a negative but insignificant 
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correlation with corporate performance with -0.338 correlation coefficient and 
0.17 significance. 
Table 14: Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 .624(a) .389 .201 .74003 
a  Predictors: (Constant), Representation on board, Debt, Number of institutionals, Net income growth 
 
Table 15: ANOVA(b) 
Model  
Sum of 
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regressi
on 4.529 4 1.132 2.068 .144(a) 
 Residual 7.119 13 .548   
 Total 11.649 17    
a  Predictors: (Constant), Representation on board, Debt, Number of institutionals, Net income growth 
b  Dependent Variable: Market to Book 
 
Table 16: Coefficients(a) 
Model  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
  B Std. Error Beta   
1 (Constant) 1.019 .471  2.167 .049 
 Net income 
growth .000 .000 .099 .413 .686 
 Number of 
institutionalism .005 .004 .272 1.170 .263 
 Debt .016 .008 .495 2.115 .054 
 Representation 
on board -.084 .048 -.400 -1.741 .105 
a  Dependent Variable: Market to Book 
 
The results for 2007 regression reveal a weak exploratory power. The adjusted R2 
= 0.201 with 0.144 significance and F statistics 2.209 at 5% significance level, 
this indicates that there is a weak relationship between all independent variables 
and the dependent variable, and a small portion (0.201) of performance in 
Palestinian listed companies can be explained by the changes in the independent 
variables. The coefficients table for 2007 shows no single significant variable, no 
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single on has a material impact to explain the changes in market value for 
Palestinian listed companies. Net income growth shows no relationship with zero 
regression coefficient and 0.69 significance. The whole number of institutional 
investors and institutionals represented on board are with insignificant 
relationship with performance but in the same direction with 2006 & 2005 
regression results. Debt is also unable to explain changes in the dependent 
variable; its regression coefficient is 0.016 with 0.054 significance. 
 Based on the above findings, we can see that there is no relationship between 
dependent and independent variables, and thus we accept the null hypothesis (H0) 
that states there is statistically insignificant relationship between number of 
institutional     investors and the corporate performance measured by Tobin's q. 
this result can be explained that the Palestine Stock Market does not distinguish 
listed companies on the bases of the number of institutional investors holding the 
stock, means that a lack of knowledge in Palestine about the true impact of 
institutional investors in how they positively affect governance issues and that 
would be reflected corporate performance.  
The following graph shows the weak relationship between the whole number of 
institutional investors investing in a particular stock and the performance of 
investee companies. This relationship is weak and insignificant for both 
logarithmic and linear calculations. It shows no difference in performance 
between small and large number of institutional investors.  
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Curve Fit 2007 
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Figure 4: 2007 regression graph 
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Table 17: Summary of regression results 
    Regression NII IR NIG Debt 
Adjust R2 0.413         
Sig 0.025 0.002 0.083 0.927 0.813 
20
05
 
Β   0.03 -0.157 0 0.003 
Adjust R2 0.63         
Sig 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.501 
20
06
 
Β   0.009 -0.115 -0.001 -0.003 
Adjust R2 0.201         
Sig 0.144 0.263 0.105 0.686 0.054 
20
07
 
Β   0.005 -0.084 0 0.016 
 
In sum, as discussed earlier the regressions for 2006 & 2005 show a significant 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables, the significant 
positive relationship is between the number of institutional investors in a 
particular stock and firm's performance was ensured in 2005 & 2006, number of 
institutionals represented on board is also with significant but negative 
relationship with performance in 2006 only, therefore we reject the null 
hypothesis and accept the alternate one. 
 Number of institutionals as a one of the corporate governance issues was tested in 
this research, increasing the number of institutional investors will improve the 
governance practices and hence will have a positive impact on corporate value by 
decreasing the conflict that may arise between small and large institutional 
investors. Increasing the number of institutionals at the expense of the percentage 
holding (de-concentration of ownership) will have a liquidity effect by buying and 
selling shares when they believe that the stock is under or over-valued enhancing 
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the stock to be traded on its fair value. The results of 2006 regression seem to be 
consistent with other studies making this study to add a value to the literature 
about the field of institutional investors and corporate performance.  
For 2007 regression analysis, its results does not support the exploratory power, 
the overall regression was insignificant at 5% significance level.  
Overall, this study did not generate consistent findings, also in this field did not 
generate conclusive evidence about the true relationship between institutional 
investors and corporate performance, so further research is needed using other 
methodologies like time series analysis or considering more companies and years 
in the sample.  
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5 CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS & 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
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5.1 Introduction   
The purpose of this chapter is to try to answer the research issues: what is the size 
of institutional investors in Palestine Securities Exchange? Does involvement by 
institutional investors have an impact on corporate financial performance? Is there 
a difference between the involvement of whole number of institutional investors 
and board member institutional investors? And then recommend some suggestions 
to be taken on the regard of the study. 
 
5.2 Conclusions 
It concludes the previous chapters' discussions regarding the role of institutional 
investors to influence corporate performance in investee companies. 
 From the previous analysis, institutional investors are the majority owners of 
most corporations listed on Palestine Securities Exchange. The results presented 
in this thesis show contradiction findings. In one hand, it revealed a significant 
positive relationship between the whole number of institutional investors and 
corporate performance measured by Tobin's q, this result was found in 2005 & 
2006, but not in 2007. On the other hand, a significant negative relationship was 
found between the number of institutional investors represented on the board of 
investee companies and firms performance in 2006 only. These results can be 
explained in light of some dimensions; liquidity & information asymmetries, 
ownership concentration, results show also that net income growth has a negative 
relationship to corporate performance. The results are somewhat consistent with 
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other studies but are inconclusive findings, results for the number of institutional 
investors are consistent with existing evidence, other variables' results are 
somewhat consistent or less consistent due the weak efficiency in the securities 
market in Palestine.  
It was found that there is an ownership concentration by some institutional 
investors in Palestine that may lead to a conflict of interest between large and 
small shareholders, it was found that one or two institutional investors control the 
board of investee companies, or it may increase its holding making the investee 
company a subsidiary or affiliate and then "who watches who?" and "who watches 
the watchers" , in which previous studies revealed that active institutional 
investors always do not set on boards 
The inconclusive findings in this thesis are not surprising, given the limited scope 
of the research in this topic, taking into consideration the weak efficiency of 
Palestine Securities Exchange & the lack of knowledge about the true impact of 
institutional investors involvement, and the newly born & small size of Palestine 
Securities Exchange that make it easy to be controlled by few number of large 
institutional investors.  
 
5.3 Recommendations 
Based on the above findings, we recommend the following, 
• Give more attention to the large institutional holding, since that there is a 
positive relationship between the whole number of institutional investors 
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and corporate performance. And a negative one between institutionals 
represented on board and performance. 
• The Capital Market Authority and Palestine Securities Exchange 
management should set regulations that prevent a percentage holding of 
share in investee companies to protect the control by few institutional 
investors.  
• To have better monitoring by large institutional investors, they should not 
set on board of investee companies in order to have wider bird's view 
image. 
• It is important to work on knowledge and informative programs about the 
good impact of the large number of institutional investors and the bad 
impact of few large institutional investors who controls boards of investee 
company, enhancing low governance practices.  
 
5.4 Suggestions for further research 
This thesis deals with the role of institutional investors on the performance of 
companies in which they invest. In order to have a wider picture about the true 
impact of institutional, further researches are needed to be conducted using other 
methodologies like using time series analysis before and after the institutional 
investors involvement, or using the same methodology by considering more 
companies or more years in the sample. Other studies are needed to relate 
institutional investors' involvement and ownership concentration. It is important 
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to conduct studies about the impact of institutional investor on the take over 
process of investee companies, do they really protect from the hostile take over? 
Another important area of research is needed to answer the questions, who leads 
to who? Institutional investors lead to better performance, or better performing 
company attracts more institutional investors and who watches the watcher? And 
conduct studies about the difference between the impact of local and foreign 
institutional investors.   
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Table 18: 2006 regression variables 
Company Q Debt Number of institutionals Rep on board NI growth
ACPC 1.41 77 10 4 -28 
AHC 1.24 2.4 37 9 296 
APC 0.852 25.3 6 1 867 
ARAB 1.331 0 11 5 -58 
ARE 0.481 21.2 4 3 1212 
AZIZA 1.124 26.1 14 10 -80 
BPC 2.869 16.8 35 0 -76 
GMC 1.176 17.7 35 7 47 
JPH 1.71 13 14 0 18 
LADAEN 1.094 30.7 17 11 -770 
PADICO 2.18 23.8 153 4 -62 
PALTEL 2.741 36.9 152 9 -20 
PEC 0.987 56.6 111 13 -4 
PIIC 0.89 21.8 26 11 -123 
PLAZA 0.766 43.5 18 7 144 
PRICO 1.076 7.3 48 10 60 
QUDS 1.303 63.3 36 5 -360 
VOIC 2.212 56 32 4 -94 
Source: www.p-s-e .com, & corporate annual reports 
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Table 19: 2005 regression variables 
Company Q Debt Number of institutionals rep on board NI growth
ACPC 3.18 85 9 4 11.99 
AHC 0.51 6 33 9 11 
APC 0.99 25 5 1 -11 
ARAB 1.09 3 13 4 -121 
ARE 0.63 40 5 3 319 
AZIZA 1.33 21 13 10 2735 
BPC 3.62 15 29 0 107 
GMC 1.54 16 32 8 1000 
JPH 4.02 19 13 0 -15 
LADAEN 1.26 26 15 6 -189 
PADICO 4.4 15 143 4 277 
PALTEL 6.81 29 136 10 84 
PEC 1.67 59 104 13 -18 
PIIC 2.05 12 27 9 1503 
PLAZA 1.28 53 15 7 -44 
PRICO 2.36 28 42 10 -195 
QUDS 1.99 76 28 2 3340 
VOIC 2.27 41 33 4 274 
Source: www.p-s-e .com, & corporate annual reports 
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Table 20: 2007 regression variables 
Company Q Debt Number of institutionals rep on board NI growth
ACPC 3.67 90.8 10 4 -89 
AHC 1.05 5.4 32 7 696 
APC 0.77 22 6 0 227 
ARAB 0.955 4.8 12 5 2096 
ARE 0.67 35.6 5 4 -107 
AZIZA 0.78 28.2 17 10 327 
BPC 2.45 21 29 0 138 
GMC 0.967 29.8 33 7 -37 
JPH 1.28 13 13 0 -6 
LADAEN 0.598 13.5 17 10 -5 
PADICO 1.19 23 145 4 -18 
PALTEL 2.34 34.2 144 10 17 
PEC 0.6 52.7 95 13 -41 
PIIC 0.72 19.3 28 11 -133 
PLAZA 0.962 55 19 7 -34 
PRICO 0.87 6.7 41 10 -70 
QUDS 0.94 80.7 23 5 -49 
VOIC 2.1 57.6 32 4 322 
Source: www.p-s-e .com, & corporate annual reports
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Table 21: Investment distribution in the PSE 
 At date 27/4/2008       
 $/JD 0.708       
     Local institutionalism Foreign institutionals 
Company No.of shares 
Share 
price 
Market 
Cap(JD) 
%of market 
cap %Holding
Amount 
(JD) %Holding Amount (JD) 
ACPC 660,000 1.25 825,000 0.0004 35.53 293,123 1.52 12,540 
AHC 20,000,000 0.89 17,800,000 0.0081 38.58 6,867,240 29.78 5,300,840 
AIB 35,000,000 1.66 58,100,000 0.0265 20.76 12,061,560 39.34 22,856,540 
AIE 1,000,000 1.25 1,250,000 0.0006 23.49 293,625 0 0 
AIG $ 30,000,000 1.32 2,803,680 0.0013 19.78 554,568 13.1 367,282 
AMB $ 30,000,000 1 21,240,000 0.0097 34.86 7,404,264 2.44 518,256 
APC 1,500,000 0.93 1,395,000 0.0006 4.58 63,891 0 0 
ARAB 9,452,328 0.75 7,089,246 0.0032 74.26 5,264,474 0 0 
ARE 948,890 0.51 483,934 0.0002 8.89 43,022 0 0 
AZIZA 9,392,330 0.92 8,640,944 0.0039 89.08 7,697,353 4.33 374,153 
BOP $ 59,769,737 3.41 144,300,880 0.0658 7.23 10,432,954 11.76 16,969,783 
BPC 12,100,000 4.6 55,660,000 0.0254 3.39 1,886,874 2.98 1,658,668 
CBP $ 20,000,000 0.8 11,328,000 0.0052 2.86 323,981 1.25 141,600 
GMC 15,000,000 0.8 12,000,000 0.0055 31.12 3,734,400 23.7 2,844,000 
HOTEL 1,150,000 1.94 2,231,000 0.0010 94.8 2,114,988 0 0 
IID 4,000,000 0.47 1,880,000 0.0009 2.42 45,496 0 0 
JCC 7,000,000 3.63 25,410,000 0.0116 28.07 7,132,587 1.03 261,723 
JPH 5,000,000 5.79 28,950,000 0.0132 15.07 4,362,765 5.34 1,545,930 
JREI $ 10,000,000 1.05 7,434,000 0.0034 9.27 689,132 54.65 4,062,681 
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     Local instituitionals Foreign instituitionals 
Company No.of shares 
Share 
price 
Market 
Cap(JD) 
%of market 
cap %Holding
Amount 
(JD) %Holding Amount (JD) 
LADAEN 7,000,000 0.58 4,060,000 0.0018 84.13 3,415,678 5.56 225,736 
MIC $ 6,214,690 0.85 5,282,487 0.0024 29.24 1,544,599 6.82 360,266 
NCI 5,000,000 0.4 2,000,000 0.0009 16.6 332,000 22.79 455,800 
NIC $ 8,000,000 4.56 25,827,840 0.0118 10.62 2,742,917 1.97 508,808 
PADICO 
$ 250,000,000 2.85 504,450,000 0.2299 9.93 50,091,885 28.43 143,415,135 
PALTEL 131,625,000 7.68 1,010,880,000 0.4606 26.26 265,457,088 43.21 436,801,248 
PEC $ 60,000,000 1.02 43,329,600 0.0197 70.56 30,573,366 3.81 1,650,858 
PIBC $ 40,000,000 1.65 46,728,000 0.0213 6.44 3,009,283 23.17 10,826,878 
PID 4,840,419 0.9 4,356,377 0.0020 15.14 659,555 0 0 
PIIC 18,750,000 0.81 15,187,500 0.0069 9.06 1,375,988 59.7 9,066,938 
PLAZA 5,220,000 0.61 3,184,200 0.0015 82.12 2,614,865 2.56 81,516 
PRICO 48,750,000 1.02 49,725,000 0.0227 8.37 4,161,983 69.06 34,340,085 
QUDS $ 50,000,000 1 35,400,000 0.0161 6.64 2,350,560 34.74 12,297,960 
UCI $ 40,000,000 0.78 22,089,600 0.0101 19.42 4,289,800 25.95 5,732,251 
VOIC 3,000,000 2.5 7,500,000 0.0034 15.11 1,133,250 28.97 2,172,750 
WASSEL 6,500,000 0.89 5,785,000 0.0026 28.26 1,634,841 13.92 805,272 
                  
      2,194,607,287     446,653,952   715,655,496 
            0.204   0.326 
       0.530  
Source: www.p-s-e .com, & corporate annual reports  
